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ABSTRACT
Small satellites organized as a constellation have the potential to offer mission capabilities comparable to traditional
large satellites at a significant cost savings. In order to evaluate the viability of using a constellation of small satellites
for any given mission, we investigate how system performance and cost relate to mission assurance. In this paper, we
compare three satellite mission architectures to a global satellite communications reference mission. The three satellite
mission architectures include (1) large constellation of low-cost small satellites (15 kg), (2) medium-sized
constellation of medium-sized satellites (800 kg) and (3) small constellation of large satellites (3000 kg). Mission
assurance is assessed for each architecture, with performance risk factors including individual satellite life expectancy,
operating environment, and other external factors affecting mission performance. We also consider resiliency as it
relates to a system’s ability to degrade gracefully. This aspect of resiliency is particularly relevant to a system
consisting of a large number of small satellites.

I INTRODUCTION

This paper examines system performance and cost
interplay with respect to mission assurance. The
performance component is defined as the ability of the
satellite constellation to successfully perform the
mission. This includes factors such as mission lifespan
as well as technical capabilities of the satellites.
Performance is of importance as it enables the
analyzation of mission capabilities. The cost
component is defined as the overall monetary cost of
the constellation including development, satellite
launch, and the continued operation of the satellites
throughout the mission lifespan. Cost is of importance
as it is a major discriminator in comparing various
satellite architectures.

Small satellite technology efforts within academia,
industry and government have resulted in a
burgeoning market place of low-cost nanosatellite
(nanosat) busses, components, and payloads [1]. (We
define small satellites as <500 kg, and nanosats as
between 1 kg and 15 kg.)
With a growing track record of mission success, the
advent of the low-cost nanosat is forcing a new look at
mission assurance expectations. The analysis of
mission assurance for a nanosat constellation requires
the consideration of their low-cost, replace-ability and
resiliency when comparing to the mission assurance of
large satellites. Ideally, these two architectures must
possess similar mission assurance and comparable
mission capabilities. This calls for a look at how
innovations in modular systems, open architectures,
and life-cycle management will impact mission
assurance.

Resiliency is also introduced as an aspect of our
mission assurance framework as it is a defining
characteristic of a nanosat constellation. Resiliency is
defined as, “the ability of a system to circumvent,
survive, and recover from failures to ultimately
achieve mission objectives” [2]. Resiliency is
applicable to a constellation of nanosats as the loss of
an individual satellite may not significantly impact the
functionality of the overall system. In that regard, our
definition of resiliency focuses on system survivability
and the ability to degrade gracefully [1, 2].

Mission assurance is defined as the assurance of
mission success. More specifically, a mission is
successful if it meets its mission requirements with a
predefined high probability of success. Typically,
mission assurance consists of four components: Cost,
Performance, Schedule, and Techniques. Each of these
components has elements which contribute to overall
mission assurance. Figure 1 depicts these components
as well as some of their contributing elements.
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In this paper, the components of mission assurance are
applied to and analyzed using a defined reference
mission. We define this reference mission as providing
commercial satellite communication capability
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globally over the next 15 years. Within this reference
mission, we compare three satellite constellation
architectures: (1) large constellation of low-cost, lowearth orbiting small satellites (referred to as NanoSat
Architecture), (2) medium constellation of mediumcost, medium-sized satellites (referred to as
MediumSat Architecture), and (3) small constellation
of high-cost geosynchronous satellites (referred to as
LargeSat Architecture). We construct our mission
assurance framework based on key mission
parameters to analyze these architectures.

748,000, which is the reported number of users on the
Iridium satellite phone network during 2015 [3]. Table
1 provides the list of the reference mission
requirements.
Table 1: Reference Mission Requirements
15 Years

Link Availability

98%

Latency

500 ms

Coverage Area

100% (Global)

Connectivity

1 Mbps

Total # of Users

748,000

The next step involves detailing three architecture
design parameters, including satellite sizes and
constellation characteristics representative of
currently available or proposed commercial satellite
configurations. The first architecture uses nanosats,
while the remaining two are constructed using
traditional, medium- and large-sized satellites.
Constellation parameters are obtained from prior
research [4, 5, 6, 7] in conjunction with the use of an
orbit analysis software tool, Systems Tool Kit (STK)
by Analytical Graphics, Inc. (AGI) [8]. Each
constellation was created in STK and the analysis
output was collected to determine the derived
parameters of the constellations. For example, the
Earth coverage of the constellation and maximum data
transmission delay (assumed as solely distance
travelled with the speed of light between opposite
sides of the Earth) were computed using STK to help
design mission architecture.
Table 2 lists a
comparison of the three defined satellite constellation
architectures, while Figure 2 provides a visualization
of the constellations using STK.

Figure 1: The four defined components of mission assurance
as well as elements of each component. Resilience is shown
to be an aspect of mission assurance, sharing the same four
components. The discussion in this paper focuses on the
performance and cost components, shown in red.

This paper is organized as follows: the design
reference mission and the key design parameters for
the three constellation architectures are given in
Section II. A discussion of our mission assurance
model as well as its performance and cost is given in
Section III while the role of resiliency for satellite
mission assurance is discussed in Section IV. The
paper concludes with current progress and future work
in Section V.

The first architecture design (NanoSat Architecture),
intended to demonstrate a potential application of
small satellites, provides a globally-connected
network using nanosats in Low-Earth Orbit (LEO)
constellation at an altitude of 600 km. This
constellation was inspired by the commercial satellite
company OneWeb, which aims to use small satellites
to provide internet connectivity to the entire world [9].
In our analysis, we choose to use nanosats (a
subcategory of small satellites) to exemplify the lowcost standardization of small satellites [1]. Due to the
low altitude and limited field-of-view of this
architecture, a very large constellation is needed to
ensure global coverage. However, low launch and
development cost of nanosats make this large
constellation an affordable option. Therefore, a large

II DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION AND
ARCHITECTURES
Our reference mission is defined to remain in line with
the interests of government and commercial satellite
missions. This mission is to provide users with global
connectivity in near real-time for the purposes of data
transfer, instant messaging and voice communications.
Key performance parameters include coverage area of
the entire Earth’s surface, bandwidth of 1 Mb/s,
latency no larger than 500 ms, and a user base of
Capella
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making them appear stationary from the Earth’s
surface [10]. This constellation is inspired by
commercial SATCOM constellations such as
Inmarsat, a commercial constellation which provides
worldwide telephone and data services using five GEO
satellites [13]. Each individual satellite in the LargeSat
architecture is considerably larger and more expensive
than the two alternative architectures because they
require more fuel to get to GEO, larger service areas
per satellite and higher radio transmit power to
overcome the distance. However, due to the large
coverage area per satellite, only five satellites are
needed to provide global coverage.

number of satellites (338) are selected for this
architecture based on STK analysis.
Table 2: Architecture Design Parameters
Architectures
NanoSat
(15 kg)

MediumSat
(800 kg)

LargeSat
(3000 kg)

Heat Flux
Exposure

1612.31
W/m^2

1612.31
W/m^2

1371
W/m^2

# Satellites

338

68

5

Inclination
Angle

87.9˚

86.4˚

3˚

600 km

780 km

36,000 km

Global
Coverage

100%

99.84%

98.17%

# Users/Satellite

2,219

11,030

150,000

81.79 ms

91.13 ms

388.54 ms

60˚

75˚

8.7˚

5 years

5 years

10 years

Orbit Altitude

Max Packet
Delay
Field of View
Expected
Lifespan

Figure 2: The constellations of each architecture within
STK. Top-left is the NanoSat Architecture, top-right is the
MediumSat Architecture, and bottom is the LargeSat
Architecture. Satellites are depicted as pink dots, their orbits
as pink lines, and their fields of view as pink, transparent
cones.

III MISSION ASSURANCE MODEL

The second architecture (MediumSat Architecture)
uses medium-sized (800kg) satellites at a slightly
higher altitude (780 km). This constellation is inspired
by commercial satellite constellations such as Iridium
NEXT, Globalstar, and Orbcomm, which aim to
provide worldwide telecommunication for services
including satellite phone coverage [3, 11, 12]. The size
of the satellites in this constellation exceeds the small
satellite definition of 500 kg, yet is differentiated from
the largest of satellites used in the third constellation
architecture [1,10]. The cost of each individual
satellite is definitely higher than the first architecture
but it has a smaller number of satellites in the
constellation.

Quantifying mission assurance and applying its
associated metrics are very complex. This is because
mission assurance involves identifying a multitude of
risks that are not always well defined. For example,
the expected lifetime of a satellite cannot be
guaranteed due to the occurrence of unexpected
factors; instead, expected lifetimes are calculated
based on expected equipment durability, reliability
records, and prior mission behavior. Our model is
represented as a multi-layer network in which
categorical nodes are defined and connected by links
reflecting conditional dependencies inspired by a
Bayesian network [14]. At its highest level, the model
accepts mission parameters as input and calculates a
risk estimate for each element of mission assurance.

The third architecture (LargeSat Architecture)
involves the largest satellites residing in
Geosynchronous-Orbit (GEO) at an altitude just above
35,000 km. This altitude causes the satellites to orbit
the Earth at the same speed as the Earth’s rotation,
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relationships between mission requirements and
derived requirements, which will vary for different
3

31st Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

mission architectures. These relationships can be
visualized as links between the nodes of the model
(Figure 3). Mission requirements consist of the key
mission assurance parameters identified in Figure 1.
In Figure 3, mission requirements are shown on the
right portion of the model and are dependent upon the
mission architecture’s derived requirements.

which have no incoming connections, are Heat Flux
Exposure, Inclination Angle, Orbit Altitude, Solar
Events,
Launch
Degradation,
Electronics
Degradation, and number of satellites. For each of the
three mission architectures, many of these
requirements can be defined based upon the
architecture design parameters found in Table 2.

Derived requirements are not explicitly demanded by
the mission requirements yet are necessary to meet
them. In Figure 3, the leftmost derived requirements
reflect the fundamental architecture design parameters
defined in Table 2. These nodes connect to a middle
layer of derived requirements, which identify multiple
dependencies of additional design parameters.
Note that Figure 3 is an example depiction of a
potential configuration of the global communication
reference mission; the links between nodes as well as
the nodes themselves may differ in practice.
Figure 4: The portion of the Mission Assurance model
associated with the Mission Life requirement, showing
relationship to the various derived requirements.

Figure 5: Spatial density of debris objects as a function of
altitude. Obtained from data obtained by Kaman Sciences
Corporation [16].

The characteristics of the dependent nodes are defined
by their various incoming connections. For example,
“Environmental Survivability” takes into account a
variety of environmental factors which may be
detrimental to satellite survivability, including
radiation, weather, etc. Also, examine the node titled
“Prob. of Debris Collision.” This node represents the
likelihood that a satellite will be negatively impacted
by the presence of space debris, leading to the
possibility of collision and consequential damage. The
defined characteristics of this node are used as an input
into the calculation of the expected “Satellite
Lifespan.” For example, the “Prob. of Debris
Collision” is a function of a spatial density of space
debris. An example spatial density is shown in Figure

Figure 3: Multi-layer network representation of the mission
assurance model. Left and centrally located nodes represent
the derived requirements of an architecture while rightmost
nodes represent mission requirements.

To facilitate explanation of our mission assurance
model due to its complexity, we examine mission life
separate from other mission requirements. Mission life
and its corresponding derived requirements are shown
in Figure 4, consisting of both independent and
dependent nodes. In this case the independent nodes,
Capella
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architecture’s ability to meet mission and derived
requirements. For example, link availability and
coverage area, which are two mission requirements
used to describe the performance of a mission, are
defined based on orbit parameters during nominal
operations (Table 2). When we consider resiliency, the
extent to which these mission requirements are
fulfilled may change based on the operational
condition. The performance component of mission
assurance, which includes link availability and
coverage area, changes based on satellite availability.
The degree of resiliency is characterized by the
changes in this system performance.

5, which depicts the spatial density of debris as a
function of altitude as observed by NASA [15]. While
this data may be somewhat dated, it shows a baseline
which can be used as a parametric distribution for this
node. In addition, if increased fidelity is desired,
further analysis can be conducted using tools such as
NASA’s ORDEM estimation tool [16].
Our approach to mission assurance was inspired by
previously conducted research concerning satellite
constellation reliability. In Engelen, et.al. [17], major
components of a satellite, such as a satellite’s OnBoard Computer (OBC), are defined as being
probabilistically dependent upon numerous derived
requirements including system storage, payload, and
propulsion. However, one differing aspect of our
model is the simplicity required to analyze the very
high-level concept of mission assurance. Engelen,
et.al. [17] suggests to model constellation components
using Markov Chain analysis whereas for our mission
assurance model, we incorporate a more basic
interpretation of the probabilistic dependencies.
Maintaining simplicity allows the mission assurance
framework to remain relevant to mission assurance
analysis as numerous and very different derived
requirements play a role in the estimation of mission
assurance.

As an example, consider the effect of the percentage
of global coverage area resulting from individual
satellite failures as it relates to resiliency. Coverage
redundancy due to the overlap in coverage area of
nearby satellites strengthens system resiliency in the
event of individual satellite failure. During the STK
analysis of the three design architectures, it is observed
that a larger number of satellites per constellation
results in increased coverage area overlap.
We
attempt to depict this resiliency trend in Figure 6 using
hypothetical coverage values following individual
satellite failures to compare the three design
architectures. A more slowly decreasing slope
indicates a constellation’s ability to maintain a higher
coverage area percentage while the percentage of
functioning satellites in the constellation decreases.
Also, a large number of satellites in a constellation
helps to avoid gaps in coverage area percentage
following the failure of an individual satellite.

Currently we are incorporating cost estimation into our
mission assurance model to aid comparison of satellite
architectures. Mission assurance costs cannot be
avoided, but with methodical application of the right
design approach and proper risk assessment at the
right time in the acquisition lifecycle, the right level of
mission assurance could be achieved for both space
systems and ground architectures with minimal
reactive costs and risks.
IV RESILIENCY
While each of the three mission architectures are
designed to meet the same mission requirements, one
aspect in which the architectures differ is resiliency.
Resiliency has become an increasingly important
concept due to the emergence of low-cost,
disaggregated, and responsive nanosat systems. As
discussed previously, resiliency is particularly
relevant to the constellation with a large number of
satellites since a single or partial system failure may
not significantly impact the functionality of the overall
system.

Figure 6: Global coverage percentage, indicating
operational utility, for each of the three design architectures
as a function of the percentage of the constellation available.
The coverage curve corresponding to the NanoSat
architecture is shown in blue, SmallSat in orange, and
LargeSat in gray.

The interplay between resiliency and the cost
component of mission assurance is another
differentiating aspect in the selection of design
architectures. The standardization of satellite systems
as seen in nanosats facilitates reduced non-recurring

Resiliency is not present as a node in the Mission
Assurance model shown in Figure 3. Instead,
resiliency is a companion to mission assurance which
should always be considered when analyzing an
Capella
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engineering cost and short production time. These
factors allow rapid constellation replenishment,
decreasing system down- time and maintaining system
resiliency.
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VI CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have developed a mission assurance
framework for small satellite missions. This
development effort is a work in progress as it provides
a basis for the analysis of mission assurance of small
satellites. We also have introduced the concept of
resiliency and its interplay with mission assurance,
further differentiating small satellite architectures
from that of traditional satellites. As made evident by
our analysis, various factors play a role in the
consideration of mission assurance. These factors
make mission assurance model and analysis
challenging and complex. Nevertheless, they must be
considered in the establishment of mathematical
models for the overall system mission assurance and
their continual development. Once model elements
have been finalized, the outcome of this effort will be
a framework that can be used to compare small
satellite design architectures to traditional satellites
and select the most viable option.
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Future work involves the establishment of
mathematical models for each element contributing to
the performance and cost components of mission
assurance. These models can then be used to conduct
simulation analysis of the selected satellite design
architectures and determine the viability of using a
constellation of small satellites.
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